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ABSTRACT 
 
 The concept of poetic inspiration as a species of madness has usually been traced 
back to Democritus of Abdera, who is believed to have been the first to use the vocabulary 
of ecstatic possession for the characteristic activity of the talented poet, in implicit contrast 
with that of the philosopher. This essay reconsiders the Democritean fragments on poets 
and poetry in light of those pertaining to divinity, mind, and perception, concluding that 
later suppositions about the irrational inspiration of poets cannot be applied to Democritus, 
who seems instead to have looked to the inspired poet as a paradigm for his own 
conception of the optimally perceptive mind.  
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ON THE DEMOCRITEAN CONCEPT OF POETIC INSPIRATION	  	  	   In the history of philosophical poetics among the Presocratics, preeminence has  
always been granted to Democritus of Abdera, whose legacy was cemented by Horace 
when he penned, 
Ingenium misera quia fortunatius arte 
credit et excludit sanos Helicone poetas 
Democritus, bona pars non unguis ponere curat,  
non barbam, secreta petit loca, balnea vitat.  
    … o ego laevus, 
qui purgor bilem sub verni temporis horam! 
non alius faceret meliora poemata.1 
 
Since native wits are more fortunate far than forlorn art,  
or so thought ol' Democritus, barring from Helicon poets 
sane, now a good part care not for any clipping o' long nails, 
nor o' their beards, but, seeking seclusion, abhor every bathhouse. 
    … How ill-omened am I then,  
Who purge my bile well, as the doctors prescribe, in the springtime!   
No one else e'er would write superior poems.  
 
And thus we are told that the very inception of philosophical poetics was betokened by an 
observation on the poet's unique and requisite psychosis. Horace's claim finds some 
corroboration both from Cicero, who twice speaks of Democritus in the same breath as the 
furor that became a by-word for litterateurs,2 and from the Greek authors Clement of 
Alexandria and Dio Chrysostom. These latter furnish two of the most striking Democritean 
fragments. The one from Clement contains a bold generalization: "Whatever a poet writes 
with a god in him (e0nqousiasmo/v) and holy breath (i9ero\n pneu~ma) is very beautiful."3 In 
the other, Dio quotes him as writing, with more focus, "Homer, alotted a divinizing nature, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Ad Pisones, 295-98, 301-3. All translations are my own unless otherwise noted. 
2 De orat. II 46, 194, De div. I 38, 80. It was, of course, not through Cicero alone that furor 
became a favored term – cf. also e.g. Statius on Lucretius, Silvae 2.7.76, which is a curious 
contrast to modern pronouncements on the tediousness of the philosopher's verse.  
3 Strom. 6.168, DK B18, G 160: poihth\v de\ a3ssa me\n a2n gra/fh| met' e0nqousiasmou~ kai\ 
i9erou~ pneu/matov, kala\ ka/rta e0sti/n.   
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built a ko/smov of manifold words."4 Not surprisingly, such curious sentiments from such a 
hard-nosed materialist have given rise to much discussion.  
 Attempts to coordinate these sparse poetics with the likewise fragmentary 
Democritean psychology, epistemology, and theology have been, however, very few. In 
what is far the most concerted effort, a 1934 monograph entitled Les conceptions de 
l'enthousiasme chez les philosophes présocratiques, A. Delatte offers a reconstruction of 
Democritus' conception of e0nqousiasmo/v,5 at the end of which he concludes, "Il a 
parfaitement aperçu l'antinomie qui existe entre ce genre d'activité [viz. poesy] et la raison; 
il a même deviné l'affinité qui unit le génie et la folie, mais les lacunes de notre 
information nous empêchent de voir nettement quelle solution il a donnée à ce difficile 
problème."6 In so casting his views, Delatte affirms Democritus as a predecessor of the 
eager modern (and ancient) spokespersons for the antinomie, drawing heavily upon the 
venerably old association—hints of which we just saw—of Democritus and Plato, who was 
without a doubt the antinomy's most vociferous advocate among the ancients.7  Indeed, the 
alignment of the two philosophers marks most of the relevant testimonia, and the rich and 
dramatic articulations of the idea of inspiration found passim in Plato are certainly the 
most inviting comparanda when one faces "les lacunes de notre information" on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Dio Chrysostom 36.1, DK B21, G 161:   3Omhrov fu/sewv laxw\n qeazou/shv e0pe/wn 
ko/smon e0tekth/nato pantoi/wn. My translation of qeazou/shv is meant to parallel the 
etymology of the Greek word and to retain the strangeness of this hapax. Further 
discussion of the meaning of qeazou/shv and of ko/smov in this fragment will be  provided 
below. 
5 Despite the general dismissal of Delatte's argument (cf. Tigerstedt [1969] 74 n. 9; also 
Ferwerda [1972] 343 n. 2), I find it well worth going through once more.  As will become 
clear, I am compelled to follow him on certain issues, but hope to compel my own reader 
toward different and more credible conclusions. 
6 Delatte (1934) 78.  
7 Whatever one thinks about the "ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy", it is 
undeniable that Plato was the first to make it so explicit.  
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Democritus. Consequently one can readily understand the temptation to assume that Plato's 
writings may give us a good idea of what his contemporary, Democritus, meant.8  
 Of course, it was Socrates who, being born in 469, was the closer contemporary of 
Democritus, also born sometime between 470 and 460.9  As for any interaction between 
them, we have no good evidence. The same holds true for Democritus and Plato, who was 
born c.429. While some biographers and one Democritean fragment put the Abderite in 
Athens for a time, the fragment in fact asserts that he found no reception whatsoever 
among the Athenians, and yet other biographers insist that he was, quite the contrary, far 
too proud to go to meet them.10  Nonetheless, his fame makes it quite likely that at least 
some word of the man and his ideas had floated into Athens in Plato's and even Socrates' 
lifetime, and Aristotle's keen engagement with his thought attests to a wide circulation and 
favorable reception not long after. But as for Socrates and Plato, there is no mention of 
either in the fragments of Democritus, and pari passu there is only the complete silence of 
Plato on Democritus. Since antiquity, Plato's silence has often been suspect, and accounts 
of some antagonism between Democritus and Plato – but really just on the part of Plato, 
never after all a paragon of eu0qumi/a – have multiplied over the millenia, the most hilarious 
story being that of Plato's endeavor to collect and burn all of Democritus' writings, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The fragments of Democritus have also been promoted as evidence in the opposite 
direction: cf. Kahn (1985) 1, "They provide us with our best evidence for the level that had 
been reached by moral reflection in the lifetime of Socrates. They permit us to imagine the 
kind of thing Socrates himself might have said; hence their study will be useful for 
reconstructing the background for Plato's own work."  
9 If we accept the records of Diogenes Laertius, then he was forty years younger than 
Anaxagoras, who was born probably 500; but as the figure of forty years is a common and 
often inaccurate one in such calculations, some have more cautiously suggested 470-460, 
thus Graham (2010) I.616. 
10 For the biographical reports, see DL IX.36, where he is quoting from Demetrius and 
others; the fragment is DK B116, which also appears in Diogenes.   
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forestalled by the suasions of none other than two conciliatory Pythagoreans.11 
 In stark contrast to such apocryphal tales of vicious philosophical rivalry, there is, 
again, a repeated assocation of the views of Democritus and Plato on poets and their 
inspiration. Yet—since those farthest apart are often also the closest—this is not so strange 
a development within the doxographical tradition. In fact, the two were persistently paired 
on a wide array of other considerations, ranging from superficial comparisons of style to 
consequential theoretical claims.12  By the same token, it should not be altogether 
surprising if, as Rein Ferwerda has observed of their views on poets and several other 
points, "on closer scrutiny we discovered that the references have often been 
misunderstood and that the similarity of certain words cannot conceal a yawning chasm 
between the philosophies of Democritus and Plato."13 
 On the other hand, most everyone else has been more accepting of the superficial 
likeness, and so, following the fragments and testimonia, the modern treatments of the 
concept of inspiration among the Greeks have typically suggested a compellingly tidy 
narrative of a Socratico-Platonic extension of the radical Democritus' ostensibly novel 
doctrine.14 The story was probably endorsed most influentially by E. R. Dodds, who, in 
that landmark The Greeks and the Irrational, claimed that "the first writer whom we know 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Diogenes Laertius (Vit. phil. 9.40) claims to be repeating a story taken from Aristoxenus. 
In its every detail, it is ultimately accepted by Ferwerda (1972), who in the very last words 
of his article "Democritus and Plato" concludes that Aristoxenus' story "proves to be true".  
12 On the affiliation of their style, see e.g. Dionysius De comp. verb. 24; Cicero Orator 20, 
67; see also De oratore II. 11, 49 on Democritus alone. For more substantive comparisons, 
see the following note. 
13 Ferwerda (1972) 351. For the pairings, see ibid. 339ff.  
14 Indeed, if the quotation by Clement is genuine, then Democritus provides our first 
attested use of the term e0nqousiasmo/v, although one need hardly add that that itself is no 
proof of a coinage on his part. See e.g. Brancacci (2007) 202 n. 81, Keuls (1978) 134. 
Mansfeld rightly notes that Plato's one usage of it () is the one more safely regarded as the 
earliest recorded usage.  
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to have talked about poetic ecstasy is Democritus … [who] denied that anyone could be a 
great poet sine furore."15  Thereupon, without offering any examination whatsoever of the 
sources, Dodds concluded that “it is to Democritus, rather than to Plato, that we must 
assign the doubtful credit of having introduced into literary theory this conception of the 
poet as a man set apart from common humanity by an abnormal inner experience, and of 
poetry as a revelation apart from reason and above reason.”16 
 This interpretation has taken hold of others before and after Dodds, and the 
essential story has remained current enough. Glenn Most, for instance, has recently glossed 
e0nqousiasmo/v in Democritus as “a temporary state of divine possession ... [the] prime 
historical importance [of which] lies in the fact that Plato was able to take it up once again 
in his own poetics and combine it with the view that the poets were not able to give an 
account of what they seemed to claim to know – thereby condemning the poets for some 
readers as ignorant and elevating them for others as inspired.”17 There is a subtle but 
significant difference between the claims of Dodds and Most, for the latter's careful 
avoidance of the favorite Roman testimony, together with his remark about Plato's new 
insistence upon the poets' own incognizance, is representative of another and growing 
trend.  In response, it would seem, to some long-standing and hard-hitting criticism,18 the 
consensus regarding Democritean e0nqousiasmo/v seems at last to be swinging away from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Dodds (1951) 82. In the footnote to that sentence, Dodds cites only DK 17 and 18, 
which without the Ciceronian quotes do not justify his use of furor.  
16 Dodds (1951) 82. 
17 Most (1999) 339. 
18 Principally Müller (1834), Tigerstedt (1969); cf. also the rarely mentioned but useful 
Ferwerda (1972), all mentioned in the following paragraph.  This backlash is connected to 
a more general one, contending that the likes of Dodds and Bruno Snell before him "had 
gone too far in emphasizing the irrational features of Greek thinking" Miller (2009) 44; see 
Miller (2009) esp. 43-44, for a brief account of the crux of the matter and some references.  
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the erstwhile fascination with the Greeks and the irrational, and the shamanic ecstasy 
which Dodds was perhaps too eager to witness, and Plato too keen to expose. Indeed, the 
reasons for reading Democritus as an irrationalist are not so strong as the Romans and the 
majority of more recent scholars would have us think, and such a reading is, above all, far 
too dependent upon impressions derived from the corpus Platonicum. 
 Plato's fuller (extant) description and critique of poets depends upon a very rigid 
division, one expressed in the relevant dialogues in terms of various oppositions, but, for 
my purposes here, most notably as those between the rational and irrational parts of the 
soul, knowledge and appearance, te/xnh and mani/a. Such hard lines are not drawn in the 
philosophy of Democritus,19 and this alone suggests that he did not share Plato's 
convictions concerning the poets' own incognizance and the categorical illegitimacy of 
their claims to telling the truth.  Equally, this difference adverts to the anachronism which 
our own post-Socratic assumptions about rationality must have when applied to 
Democritus, who merely "came nearer to having a notion of reason … as we find it from 
Socrates onwards."20 Moreover, as many have noted, there is absolutely none of Plato's 
censorious tone in Democritus' admiring sentiment about the wordsmith's marvelous 
kosmos.21  His sentiment, I submit, even hints at the very opposite: namely, that the great 
poet was, in Democritus' eyes, exceptionally knowledgeable and conscious, and that his 
godliness was the result of a natural endowment sometimes, perhaps, augmented by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 However much one may try to drive a wedge between the two types of gnw/mh which 
Sextus reports, h9 me\n gnhsi/h h9 de\ skoti/h, the fact remains that they are both types of 
gnw/mh. Sextus Adv. M. vii.139. 
20 Frede (1996) 21-22. Emphasis added. This has, of course, been noted before by e.g. 
Bailey (1928) 161, and even Delatte, but in my opinion not sufficiently kept in mind by 
most commentators. 
21 Most recently, Porter (2010) passim, preceded by Ferwerda (1972) 343ff., Tigerstedt 
(1969) 75, and well before them Müller (1834) 20ff.  
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"divine" (whatever it may prove to be) – but not supplanted or possessed, nor rendered 
irrational.   
 So much has been suggested by Penelope Murray, who at the conclusion of her 
excellent and otherwise thorough survey, "Poetic Inspiration in Early Greece", finally 
comments on the subject at hand: "It was Plato who, so far as we know, first opposed the 
concepts of poetic inspiration and technique when he described inspiration as 
e0nqousiasmo/v. Even Democritus, who is often considered a precursor to Plato, evidently 
did not consider inspiration and technique as incompatible."22  While I agree entirely, her 
treatment of Democritus is, as scholarship, even more superficial than that of Dodds, since 
she cites only f. 21, pivotally ignoring the e0nqousiasmo/v which appears, as we saw, in f. 
18.  But Murray does pinpoint the heart of the matter, and the worthy remainder of her 
conclusion will help me better to frame my own project, and so I quote it in full:   
In fact throughout early Greek poetry there seems to be an equal emphasis on craft and 
inspiration. If we are unable to accept this fact, it must be because we have certain preconceived 
notions about the concept of poetic inspiration and its relation to the idea of poetry as a craft. 
Doubtless the notion of inspiration originated from the poet's feeling of dependence on the 
divine. And this feeling corresponds to the belief of many poets throughout history that, as 
Dodds put it, "creative thinking is not the work of the ego." But the idea of poetic inspiration in 
early Greece differs in a number of important ways from subsequent conceptions. It was 
particularly associated with knowledge, with memory and with performance; it did not involve 
ecstasy or possession, and it was balanced by a belief in the importance of craft. But although it 
therefore laid far more emphasis on the technical aspects of poetic creativity, it was nevertheless 
an idea essentially connected with the phenomenon of inspiration as we know it.23 
 
 The reader will have discerned by now the basic historical inquiry of this essay: 
whether Democritus, assuming that he did articulate a materialistic psychology of the poet 
and his inspiration of which we have only two of the most pointed and memorable 
sentences, had offered up one which was more consonant with the imposing poetics of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Murray (1981) 99-100. 
23 Murray (1981) 100, citing Dodds (1951) 81. 
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archaic "Masters of Truth,"24 or one which chimes rather with Plato's "ancient quarrel". In 
the lacunose historical record, Democritus' poetics themselves lie in an abyss between the 
better substantiated ideas, and while so many would look for him climbing up to the 
heights of Plato's cogitations, there are good reasons for overlooking those heights as we 
attempt to espy him. 
 This anti-Platonic program notwithstanding, any reconstruction of Democritean 
doctrine more attuned to this perspective will have a noteworthy parallel in certain 
scholarship on the daimo/nion of Socrates, which has sought to reconcile Socrates' 
celebrated rationality with his reliance upon "the customary divine sign."25  In both 
circumstances, the same traditional assumptions must be dispelled by re-examining the 
historically situated conceptions of divinity and of mind and reason, and explicating a form 
of revelation which does not at all diminish the recipient's rationality and wisdom as 
understood by the original proponents of these ideas of divine communion with human 
minds. Secondly, the comparison is all the more pointed for the usefulness of some of the 
evidence adduced by the scholars writing on Socrates, both for the present task of 
interpreting Democritus and also for relating him and the Platonic Socrates within a 
broader historical narrative. 26  Finally, in attributing to Democritus such a positive 
assessment of the poet's psychology, I am building, just as the Socratic apologists,27 upon 
the steadily increasing, critical response to earlier, less sympathetic readings. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 cf. Marcel Detienne (1996) The Masters of Truth in Archaic Greece. 
25 e.g. Euthyd. 272e4; Phaedr. 242b9. 
26 One piece, from Plutarch, has also been used by Delatte for his discussion of 
Democritean e0nqousiasmo/v – but again I hope to put it to new and better use.  
27 A label at which the moderns in question would doubtlessly balk – But their status as 
such is indisputable, however lacking they may be in the single-minded devotion and frank 
religiosity of their ancient colleagues. 
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 There is good evidence that Democritus, too, attempted something similar for 
Homer, who stood in need of some allegorical rehabilitation after an onslaught of 
excoriation from the monists and other camps.28 Yet the possible significance of Homeric 
allegoresis for Democritus' thought on poets, and indeed his thought as a whole, has, to my 
mind, barely been countenanced. Instead it is widely assumed that the radical materialist 
and borderline skeptic did not share the usual allegorist's assumption of a visionary sage 
concealing philosophical truths in more fanciful garb, and that his pronouncements on 
Homer's ko/smov and enthusiastic verses speak rather to a pure aestheticism, and indeed the 
sort of subjectivist aesthetics then nascent among the sophists.29 Thus Aldo Brancacci, 
while implicitly affirming Democritus' acceptance of a materialist reworking of the 
traditional attitude toward poetic inspiration, nonetheless goes on to write, "For 
Democritus, however, divine inspiration no longer assured, as with the poets Homer and 
Hesiod, the truth of the poetic work, but its beauty: beautiful—not true—are all the things 
that the poet may write, driven by enthusiasm and divine breath."30 Brancacci's claim, 
suffice it (for now) to say, is based on an implausibly subjectivist reading of kala/ in f. 18, 
and ignores the implications of any allegorist's interpretations, even the minimally 
charitable. I shall return to this point later, but for the time being any further conclusions 
about Democritus and allegoresis must be postponed.  
 Also ranking among the most sympathetic scholars now working on Democritus, 
James Porter has recently published some relevant if passing remarks which anticipate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 On allegoresis and philosophy, see e.g. Most (1999), Naddaf (2009).  
29 But see Naddaf (2009) 116. 
30 Brancacci (2007) 204; emphasis in the original. 
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certain aspects of my argument, yet also overshoot the mark that I have in sight.31 Thus, 
while he writes approvingly of Democritus' "comments on the inspirational sources of 
poets (which he doubtless would have traced to physiological causes),"32 he adds in a 
footnote the following idea: "In this light, Democritus' fragment on enthusiasm … could be 
understood not as a sign of his embracing the traditional poetics of inspiration but as 
paralleling his critique of religion, or at least as his acknowledgment that the sources of 
inspiration are purely phantasmal, entirely lacking in any material reality … Democritus' 
theory might thus be best called a poetics of the phantasmal."33 Porter's own taste for the 
poetical and fantastic has here led him to abandon the solid ground of the "distinctively 
non-subjective material origins."34 Despite Guthrie's support for this interpretation,35 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Porter's relevant sympathy for Democritus is evident from his studies of Democritus 
versus Plato et al. (esp. in the admittedly polemical, anti-idealist exploration of materialist 
aesthetics that constitutes his The Origins of Aesthetic Thought in Ancient Greece), and 
from his self-identification with the laughing philosopher (see his personal website for the 
clearest demonstration). 
32 Porter (2010) 210.  
33 Porter (2010) 212 n.116; emphasis in original. 
34 Porter (2010) 213. Similarly in a previous work he wrote, "Democritus conceived of 
time in purely phenomenal terms. 'Time is an appearance [phantasma], " a mere [!] 
simulacrum, "resembling day and night," hence unreal: it is a sensation generated 
epiphenomenally from configured bits of material reality, a synthesis with only a 
psychological reality." Porter (2002) 132; emphasis in original (save the exclamation 
point!).  In this regard, one may note that although Porter does not reference it, his account 
is significantly anticipated by Marx in his doctoral dissertation, Part II Chapter 4. It is also 
preceded by similar but more cautious remarks from Guthrie, whom he cites here but not 
in Porter (2010). But this is shameless exaggeration: in the passage from which he quotes, 
Sextus does not purport to be citing Democritus directly, but writes, "There seems to be 
ascribed to the scientists of the school of Epicurus and Democritus some such conception 
of time as this: 'Time is an appearance in the form of night and day.'"(trans. Taylor, DK 
A72, T 65) When one considers Aristotle's remark that according to Democritus "time did 
not come into being," but is in fact infinite, Phys. 251b17, one must conclude that for 
Democritus time was not "epiphenomenal," however contingent any given experience of it 
must be. Guthrie (1965) 430 also cites this, concluding that "if Democritus made this 
remark of time in general, it could only have been as an analogy." 
35 cf. Guthrie (1965) II 427-30 on the subjectivity of time; ibid. 476 on that of gods. 
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Porter's arch encapsulation of the "poetics of the phantasmal" is certainly dubious: 
assuming that Democritus' critique of religion relegated all divinity to the purely subjective 
and conventional fiction, Porter then infers from the pious terms of Clement's quote that 
Democritus had his tongue unbelievably well imbedded in his cheek.36 If we cannot 
glimpse anything else in this fragment, then we have lost all of our clues as to the 
physiology of inspiration.  When we combine this interpretation of f. 18 with f. 21, then, as 
with Brancacci's understanding of kala/, we are left with the distastefully subjectivist and 
all-too-modern suggestion that Homer was a successful poet just because he was prone to 
magnificent hallucinations.  
 Now that some lines have been drawn, and in order to stake out a firmer position in 
this broad field of scholarly contention, I will turn to a more scrupulous Quellenkritik.  To 
begin with a blanket condemnation: one can gain little hope from the superficiality of the 
famous remarks from Cicero and Horace, disappointingly equalled by those from Dio and 
Clement. Cicero, first of all, reveals himself to be wholly ignorant of the place that such 
furor could have in Democritus' thought, first admitting that he has merely "often heard 
that which they say has been left behind by Democritus and Plato in their writings, that no 
one can be a good poet without an inflammation of the spirits, and without a certain 
inspiration (afflatus) as if of madness (furor),"37 and in the second place proclaiming, "Let 
him [viz. Democritus] call it furor, provided that this furor is thus praised as it is in Plato's 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Admittedly, one might suggest that an ironical tone could have been clear from an 
original context.  
37 De orat. II, 46, 194: Saepe enim audivi poetam bonum neminem—id quod a Democrito 
et Platone in scriptis relictum esse dicunt—sine inflammatione animorum exsistere posse, 
et sine quodam afflatu quasi furoris.
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Phaedrus."38 Thus a confident but uninformed association of Democritus and Plato, 
deriving from some uncertain mixture of relative popularity and Cicero's own biases, had 
already made a Platonizing interpretation the only one available, or had anyway rendered it 
satisfactory on its own.  Next, the bilem of Horace's polemic demonstrates a potentially 
distorting absorption of Democritean doctrine (where bile and its Greek equivalent, xolh/, 
have no place), into the related principles of Aristotelian physiology and humoral theory, 
and therewith of the conjunction giving rise to a still familiar platitude about the 
melancholy (or atrabiliousness) of any brooding creator.39 So, while their remarks may yet 
shed some light on the far-reaching historical transmission and distortion of Democritus' 
own theory, and thus allow us to see however muddily ex pede Herculem, Cicero and 
Horace are of very little help in reconstructing it, as it were, ab incunabulis.  
 Clement and Dio similarly make no attempt to explain the fragments, save the 
simplest glosses.40 Worse still, Jaap Mansfeld would have it that the words from Clement 
are in fact a misleading paraphrase of the quotation from Dio, who himself is probably 
trustworthy enough, although he exhibits no really superior philosophical aim.41 
Mansfeld's argument and the two sources demand closer scrutiny, and I will start with 
Clement: the following opens the final chapter of Book 6 of his Stromata:  
Ei]ta peri\ me\n poihtikh~v Pla/twn "kou~fon ga/r ti xrh~ma kai\ i9ero\n poihth/v" gra/fei "kai\ 
ou0x oi[o/v te poiei~n, pri\n a2n e1nqeo/v te kai\ e1kfrwn ge/nhtai." kai\ o9 Dhmo/kritov o9moi/wv 
"poihth\v de\ a3ssa me\n a2n gra/fh| met' e0nqousiasmou~ kai\ i9erou~ pneu/matov kala\ ka/rta 
e0sti/n." i1smen de\ oi[a poihtai\ le/gousin. tou\v de\ tou~ pantokra/torov profh/tav qeou~ ou0k 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 De div. I, 80: Quem, si placet, appellet furorem, dum modo is furor ita laudetur ut in 
Phaedro Platonis laudatus est.  
39 First expressed, it seems, in the pseudo-Aristotelian Problems  (perhaps authentic in the 
relevant section – see Forster [1928]), which will be mentioned again toward the end of 
this paper.  
40 Dio, as will be seen below, unmistakably provides his own gloss, whereas Clement may 
or may not, depending on how one interprets the text.  
41 Mansfeld (2004) 487. 
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a1n tiv kataplagei/h o1rgana qei/av genome/nhv fwnh~v; 42  
 
Therefore while concerning poetry Plato writes, "For the poet is some light and sacred thing and 
is not able to poetize until he should become possessed (e0nqeo/v) and out of his mind (e1kfrwn)." 
And Democritus likewise, "Whatever things, on the one hand, a poet should write with a god in 
him (e0nqousiasmo/v) and holy breath (i9ero\n pneu~ma) are very beautiful." But we on the other 
hand know what sort of things the poets say. Then should one not be in awe of the prophets of 
the almighty beeoming organs of the divine voice?  
 
The quotation from Plato, as Mansfeld has noted, is truly butchered: some words have 
been transposed, others omitted, one added.43 Such recklessness with a text of the revered 
and oft-quoted Plato must be taken as an unintended caveat for the quote which follows. 
Yet, except for a questioning tone in Guthrie's description of Clement's "ostensibly quoting 
Democritus's own words",44 Mansfeld's 2004 note marks the first and only argument 
against its authenticity of which I am aware. His basic points are compelling enough: that 
Clement's text adds little to Dio's except a vocabulary that smacks of later usage, and that 
his demonstrable unreliability concerning the quotation from Plato give a careful reader 
good reason to suspect the author's exactitude. So, although I do not share his confidence 
on every point (for instance, I	  do	  not	  see	  the	  strangeness	  of	  poihth/v, nor the 
obviousness of such points as that the "term e0nqousiasmou~ is clearly inspired by the 
original qeazou/shv"), I am inclined to follow his lead, having myself a few considerations 
to add in favor of a less trusting employment of the text. 
 But first it is necessary to weigh an argument in favor of the fragment, from Delatte 
and, well after him, Brancacci, who disagrees with Mansfeld and treats the fragment as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Strom. 6.168 (827 P. 46-9). I print Dindorf's (1869) Oxford text, unaltered by Stähler 
(1906) and Descourtieux (1999), save a kolon before the quote from Democritus, and those 
charming continental quotation marks. 
43 The original text, from Ion 534b: kou~fon ga\r xrh~ma poihth/v e0stin kai\ pthno\n kai\ 
i9ero/n, kai\ ou0 pro/teron oi[o/v te poiei~n pri\n a1n e1nqeo/v te ge/nhtai kai\ e1kfrwn. 
44 Guthrie (1965) 477.  
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genuine. Apparently unaware of Delatte's prior discussion,45 Brancacci presents an 
argument for its authenticity that is nearly identical to his predecessor's, namely that the 
"presence of me/n in the expression poihth\v de\ a3ssa me\n a2n gra/fh| … leads us to believe 
that the Democritus fragment contained an antithesis, and that, after the expression kala\ 
ka/rta e0sti/n, it continued with a reference to the works of poets that had not been written 
met' e0nqousiasmou~ and thus were not 'truly beautiful', i.e. were not poetic works."46  
Mansfeld did not weigh in on the me/n, and it is a persuasive exegesis which Brancacci and 
Delatte have offered, so I must concede their point: the me/n to which they refer, along with 
the preceding first words of the quotation, does seem unlikely as the stuff of a careless 
paraphrase, and one must ask, above all, why he would write the me/n but not follow it with 
a clearly corresponding particle.47  
 It must also be granted that what the purported fragment contains is not (pace 
Mansfeld) so thoroughly inconceivable a description in the context of the remaining 
Democritea, although none of the three terms on the table, e0nqousiasmo/v, i9ero/v, or 
pneu~ma, appears again.  Indeed, the explication of e0nqousiasmo/v "the state of having god 
within one" and with it i9ero\n pneu~ma "holy breath" is not so unimaginable when according 
to Democritus to breathe is to inhale soul atoms, the very stuff of anything divine as well.48 
The combination therefore must seem somewhat redundant, but the second phrase may 
seem, prima facie, to be an explanatory afterthought in an alluring blend of conventional 
and quasi-physiological terms. For that, valid parallels are given in Mansfeld's citations of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Delatte's work appears in the Bibliography of the collection (Democritus: Science, The 
Arts, and the Care of the Soul), but is not cited by Brancacci.  
46 Brancacci (2007) 201; see also ibid. 197, and Delatte (1934) 32.  
47 I owe my good sense in this entirely to the guidance of Profs. Sanders and Augoustakis. 
48 Sources to be discussed below. 
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Aristotle, Plutarch, and Cassius Dio, who use i9ero\n pneu~ma for the superstitiously-labelled 
sneeze, "the holy and divine pneu~ma among the muses" which was Homer,49 and the 
Pythia's mythical vapors, respectively.50 Yet the conventionally religious tone of each of 
those, not to mention the usual application of i9ero/v (one thinks of i9era\ no/sov),51 must 
render the irreligious Democritus' use of it a smidge less plausible.  
 At the same time, Guthrie's and Mansfeld's assumption of a need to "de-
Christianize" these words,52 if it derives from the most obvious assumption, is entirely 
baseless, because the collocation occurs nowhere else in the early Christian authors, 
pneu~ma a3gion instead being the conventional phrase for their Holy Spirit.53  Yet a less 
obvious possibility remains which could make his allegiances significant. When Clement 
was writing, pneu~ma was a popular term among Christian authors for that by means of 
which any prophet spoke, along with all those speaking in tongues, and even for "the 
divine influence exercised on the thoughts and sentiments of men generally."54  As for 
i9ero/n, it is noteworthy that Clement elsewhere shows himself willing to use i9ero/v of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 It is not exactly, as Mansfeld (2004) 486 suggests, the breath which "caused Homer (him 
again) to be fought over by the cities who claimed him as their own" – the more proximate 
cause to which Plutarch there refers is the fact that he was not the praiser of one city alone, 
while the phrase to\ d' i9ero\n kai\ daimo/nion e0n mou/saiv pneu~ma is simply in apposition 
to  3Omhron (Exil. 605a). 
50 For citations see Mansfeld (2004) 486. Cf. also Philo Judaeus De virtutibus 135.7, who 
writes of th\n i9erwta/thn pneu/matov fu/sin, hypothesizing that it would prevent a flame 
from touching an unholy sacrifice made of a mother animal and its offspring.   
51 See LSJ s.v. – and of course the Hippocratic De morbo sacro.  
52 Guthrie (1965) n. 2, whose slight skepticism was noted above. For Guthrie, writing prior 
to the convenience of digital databases, and therefore (I assume) being unable to locate 
even the instance which Mansfeld cites from Aristotle, this oversight too is rather 
forgivable.  
53 See Arndt and Gingrich, A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other 
Early Christian Literature, 2nd ed. 1958, s.v. pneu~ma. 
54 The quotation is taken from LSJ. For fuller discussion and references, see Arndt and 
Gingrich op. cit.  
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pagans and their own revered objects, whereas a9gio/v seems to be reserved for the more 
properly christened.  Ergo, for an author who so regularly refers to the pneu~ma a9gio/n, the 
mention of a i9ero\n pneu~ma would undoubtedly recall the usual solemn utterance, and 
accordingly there could not be a more perfect phrase for strengthening the contrast at 
hand.55 
 As to what remains in the ostensible fragment, there is another and deeper motive 
for suspecting the occurence of e0nqousiasmo/v as well. After all, as Mansfeld has 
suggested, with the dismissal of the fragment we really lose nothing but a bias toward an 
extravagant and Platonizing interpretation, a bias revealed most clearly in the conclusions 
reached by Delatte in his emphasis upon f. 18 and Platonic assistance. This tendency 
derives from the impression of an occasional and overwhelming passivity given most 
strongly by f. 18, and principally as a result of its momentous use of e0nqousiasmo/v, a 
word which (along with its cognates from e1nqeov) is not found elsewhere in the fragments, 
and is otherwise first attested in Plato, who noticeably reveals a greater tendency toward 
such denominative verbs and their cognate nouns.56  The term must be significantly 
stranger in Democritus, since the etymological relation to e1nqeov is plain, and with it the 
implication of a separate and possessing qeo/v, which Plato makes all too explicit in his 
discussions.57 The term and its cognate verb were moreover so popularized by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 A cursory search revealed over thirty instances of the phrase.  
56 The word e0nqousiasmo/v occurs once in Plato, Tim. 71e6, and cognate forms some 
thirteen times. On the denominative verbs and nouns, my judgement rests on the basis of 
simple searches for –az- and –asm- in both authors. Of course, given the highly 
fragmentary nature of Democritus' writings, this can be of little weight. Yet perhaps Plato's 
essentialism would support this line of thought. 
57 cf. e.g. Meno 99d3.  
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Peripatetics and the later Platonists,58 that of the two possibilities, a later paraphrase 
appears so far to be the more probable.  
 Clement's authority on Democritus may be doubted further still, on the grounds that 
he gives a more obviously distorted account of the atomist's doctrine elsewhere, writing of 
the "ei1dwla falling upon humans and irrational animals from the divine being (a0po\ th~v 
qei/av ou0si/av)."59 Democritus, it must be noted, would not have used ou0si/a for anything 
but an atom, to say nothing of the distinction between humans and irrational animals, a 
distinction which by all accounts is not made before Aristotle.60   
 Coincidentally, the same anachronism mars another testimonium around which 
much debate and also Delatte's reconstruction revolve, where Aëtius relates that 
"Democritus [says] that there are more senses [i.e. than the regular five] for irrational 
animals, for wise men, and for gods."61  Given the problem of a1loga alone, I am inclined 
to set this testimonium aside, too, in the pursuit of Democritean psychology of the poet. 
Thus I will proceed for now without recourse either to Clement's text or this sixth sense. 
 Happily juxtaposed with that mess, we have the quote from Dio Chrysostom, 
provided at the very beginning of his oration On Homer:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 The word is used four times by Aristotle, and appears in the fragments of Theophrastus; 
its further doctrinal significance is indicated by e.g. the title Peri\ e0nqouisasmou~ found in 
Diogenes' lists for both Theophrastus (DL V.43) and Strato (DL V.59). As for the 
Platonists, the term appears all of forty times in Plutarch, to cite only one example. 
59 DK A79: ei2dwla toi~v a0nqrw/poiv prospi/ptonta kai\ toi~v a0lo/goiv zw/ioiv a0po\ 
th~v qei/av ou0si/av.  
60 In one of the fragments attributed to "Demokrates" (taken to be a garbled "Democritus," 
though the authenticity of the sayings is highly doubtful), DK 68 B82, ou0si/a is used in an 
ethical application in the more idiomatic sense of personal "substance." Otherwise, on 
ou0si/a in Democritus and Clement's fragment, cf. Guthrie (1965) 481, Hershbell (1982) 91 
n. 36. On the anachronism of zw/ia a1loga, see e.g. Sorabji (1996).  
61 Aët. IV 10, 4 (DK 68 A116): D. plei/ouv ei]nai ai0sqh/seiv peri\ ta\ a1loga zw|~a kai\ 
peri\ tou\v sofou/v kai\ peri\ tou\v qeou/v. cf. Guthrie (1965) 449 & 478 n.1.  
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9O me\n Dhmo/kritov peri\  9Omh/rou fhsi\n ou3twv:  3Omhrov fu/swv laxw\n qeazou/shv 
e0pe/wn ko/smon e0tekth/nato pantoi/wn: w(v ou0k e0no\n a1neu qei/av kai\ daimoni/av fu/sewv 
ou3twv kala\ kai\ sofa\ e1ph e0rga/sasqai.62  
 
Now Democritus concerning Homer speaks thus: "Homer, alotted a divinizing nature, built a 
ko/smov of manifold words;" as though it is not possible without a divine and demonic nature to 
fashion such beautiful and wise words. 
 
The context, while also devoid of doxographical purpose, is nevertheless enormously 
preferable. To repeat, at the very outset of this panegyric on the Hellenes' greatest poet, 
Dio appeals to the authority of none other than Democritus! The language of the fragment 
is almost entirely that of the most dignified descriptions of a poet's activity: in the opening 
ascription of Homer's grandeur to his fu/siv, in the proud metaphor of monumental 
construction, and in the phrase e0pe/wn ko/smon which echoes Solon perhaps and most likely 
Parmenides.63 The only exception is the hapax qeazou/shv, which according to the 
Etymologicum Gudianum is synonymous with mainome/nhv.64  While that gloss has 
satisfied most interpreters (even the cautious Mansfeld!),65 I doubt whether it is really apt, 
and whether Heraclitus' remark about the Sybil "with raving mouth" (mainome/nw| 
sto/mati) is a good comparandum;66 whatever a Greek might say about the Sybil, not even 
Plato in the Ion dared to ascribe actual madness, divine or otherwise, directly to Homer, 
who although some others called him ignorant and deceptive was not yet the vinosus 
Homerus whom one encounters in Horace.67  And it is surely significant that Dio himself 
glosses the peculiar wording with the phrase "as though it is not possible without a divine 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Or. 53.1.	  
63 Parmenides DK B8.52. (I will have more to say later on this possible allusion and 
Democritus' allegorical rehabilitation of Homer following the attacks of Parmenides and 
others.) Solon fr. 1.2 West ap. Plu. Sol. 8; citation from Mansfeld (2004) 484, who notes 
other and only later occurrences of the phrase.  
64 Although it appears there as qeazo/ntwn, glossed as mainome/nwn. 
65 Mansfeld (2004) 485. cf. Delatte (1934) 32-3. 
66 Heraclitus DK B92. cf. Mansfeld (2004) 485. 
67 Ep. 19.6.  
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and demonic nature to fashion such beautiful and wise words", rather than some mention 
of divine inspiration such as he makes later on in the oration.68 Furthermore, the participle 
strikes me as a neologism too deliberate be a mere equivalent of qei~ov, devoid of 
theoretical commitments. As our own modern lexicographers have appropriately defined it, 
this denominative verb must mean "to be (a) god", or, what they do not suggest, "to make 
(a) god".69  Lacking the prefix which would bring it in line with the terms used by Plato 
(including e0nqea/zw "to be e1nqeov"), qeazou/shv would seem to indicate very deliberately 
that no separate agency had used Homer as its mouthpiece. Thus, if the text is correct, 
Democritus must be making a point about Homer's nature being itself divine and/or 
making him divine. This is a far cry from the implications of forceful possession so easily 
extracted from f. 18, and thus puts us on safer ground.  
 For all that, we may now seem to be faced vis-à-vis f. 21 with little more than an 
old-fashioned bit of high praise, albeit couched in Democritean coinage and, one hopes, 
not uninformed by nor incompatible with the atomist's other teachings. It will be my 
ultimate contention that it is just that. With the avoidance of f. 18, the tension which so 
many have seen between a belief in divine inspiration and his materialist philosophy 
vanishes. Still, there remain some very intriguing connections to be drawn between f. 21 
and other aspects of his thought. So that fragment together with the remaining material still 
gives us plenty to chew on, and on the basis of this I will attempt to give an account of the 
psychology of the poet, and a reconstruction which may satisfy these opening conclusions, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 At 53.6 he writes "Indeed, without divine favour, without inspiration (e)pipnoi/av) of the 
Muses and Apollo, it i ssimply impossible for poetry to be created which is so lofty and 
magnificent, and withal so sweet…" I print Crosby's Loeb translation, and must disagree 
with him when he notes that "Dio here reverts to the doctrine of Democritus."  
69 LSJ s.v. On denominative verbs, see Smyth 866.  
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and may also explain the readiness with which Democritus' views were confused by the 
later tradition. The analysis will lead us back, finally, to a more cautious reconsideration of 
Clement's words, the sixth sense, and certain aspects of the relation of Democritean 
doctrine to those before and after. 
 It seems best to begin with the grandest issue just raised, that of the divine and its 
place in the ko/smov, which also remains one of the most hotly contested in Democritean 
studies. To be fair to Porter, others have argued forcefully enough that Democritus 
dismissed all notions of divinity as misbegotten fictions. Although certain testimonia do 
suggest this, the assumption that Democritus was willing to grant divinity to some forms of 
existence better prepares us to take into account all of the relevant material. I will frame 
my discussion again with a muddled transmission, in the ideas which Cicero, through the 
mouth of the character Cotta, imputes to Democritus and mocks as worthier of the 
famously dull Abderites than of their philosophical fellow citizen. While the description is 
slightly confused, the confusion is one endemic to commentaries on Democritus, and so it 
provides a solid cornerstone for this discussion.  
Mihi quidem etiam Democritus, vir magnus in primis, cuius fontibus Epicurus hortulos suos 
inrigavit, nutare videtur in natura deorum. tum enim censet imagines divinitate praeditas inesse 
in universitate rerum, tum principia mentis, quae sunt in eodem universo, deos esse dicit, tum 
animantes imagines, quae vel prodesse nobis solent vel nocere, tum ingentis quasdam imagines 
tantasque, ut universum mundum conplectantur extrinsecus; quae quidem omnia sunt patria 
Democriti quam Democrito digniora; quis enim istas imagines comprehendere animo potest, 
quis admirari, quis aut cultu aut religione dignas iudicare?70 
 
For my own part I believe that even that very eminent man Democritus, the fountain-head from 
which Epicurus derived the streams that watered his little garden, has no fixed opinion about the 
nature of the gods. At one moment he holds the view that the universe includes images endowed 
with divinity; at another he says that there exist in this same universe the elements from which 
the mind is compounded, and that these are gods; at another, that they are animate images, 
which are wont to exercise a beneficent or harmful influence over us; and again that they are 
certain vast images of such as size as to envelop and enfold the entire world. All these fancies 
are more worthy of Democritus's native city than of himself; for who could form a mental 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 De natura deorum 1.43.120, G 182. Trans. Rackham in the Loeb. 
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picture of such images? who could adore them and deem them worthy of worship or reverence?  
 
As Guthrie has shown, easy confusions arise in such facile synopses of Democritean 
doctrine, because the closely related phenomena of fire and soul are more often than not 
completely and incorrectly equated by the commentators, misled by the trend among other 
philosophers. Aristotle himself relates that soul (yuxh/) and fire (pu~r) are identical for 
Democritus,71 but elsewhere gives us reason to doubt that simple picture, saying that the 
soul is rather "a kind of fire and heat" (pu~r ti kai\ qermo/n),72 and then that "soul and heat 
(to\ qermo/n) are the same thing, the primary figures of spherical shape."73 The implication 
of the latter two quotations combined is perhaps clear enough: soul and heat and fire are 
related but discernible phenomena produced by the same type of atom, namely the 
smallest, roundest, and most mobile.74 According to Atomist cosmology, these very atoms 
were expelled, owing to their fineness and mobility, out from among the larger and heavier 
atoms and into the upper reaches of the ko/smov, still filling the atmosphere but largely 
gathering around the fiery heavenly bodies (some of which were previously composed of 
cold earth),75 which together with the inflamed outer membrane (u9mh/n or xitw/n) of the 
ko/smov, "embrace the entire world extrinsically" (universum mundum complectantur 
extrinsecus).76  The easy identification of fire and soul would encourage the assumption 
that these bodies, if anything, are divine, and perhaps Democritus even called them "gods" 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 De an. 405a5-13, DK A101, G 115.    
72 De an. 403b31, found in DK A28, G 113.  
73 De respir. 471b30-472a18, DK A106, G 114: le/gei d' w9v h9 yuxh\ kai\ to\ qermo\n 
tau0to/n… 
74 Ar. De an. 405a5-13, DK A101, G 115.  
75 [Plutarch] Misc. 7, DK A39, G62.  
76 Aët. 2.7.2, DK 67 A23; cf. Guthrie (1965) II 408-10, who compares, inter alia, the 
Orphic (!) account of the order of the universe as an egg. 
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accordingly: Aëtius tells us that Democritus held god to be "mind in spherical fire".77  Yet 
there is apparently no complete identification of soul and fire, since we are told that the 
stars are not living things (zw~ia),78 and that the ko/smov as a whole is "neither ensouled 
(e1myuxon) nor ordered by providence (pronoi/a| diakei~sqai)."79  Certain principles, then, 
must have prevented Democritus from considering all forms of fire and heat to be also 
yuxh/.  A clue is given by Theophrastus, who writes, "Concerning thinking he has said this 
much: it occurs when the soul is in a balanced state amid the movement."80 One may 
extrapolate from this that the same atoms under certain conditions would produce only 
minimal warmth, and under the opposite such intense heat as to preclude any semblance of 
mind. So perhaps it is right to conceive of a spectrum of phenomena produced by these 
fine, spherical atoms, at one end of which is the most minimal movement and warmth—at 
the other, astronomical conflagrations.  Still, in the sublunary realm, to borrow a phrase, 
there exists a plethora of perceptive animals: is it possible that among them are clouds of 
atoms, endowed with mind, resembling somewhat the old gods of tradition?   
 In a fragment which has suffered the most diverse interpretations, Democritus 
wrote, "Among the learned men (logi/wn a0nqrw/pwn), a few, raising their hands to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Aët. 1.7.16, DK A74: D. nou~n to\n qeo\n e0n puri\ sfairoeidei~. 
78 DK 67 B1, G 63: tou\v a0ste/rav de\ zw~ia ei]nai ou1te 0Anacago/rai ou1te Dhmokri/twi 
e0n tw~i Mega/lwi diako/smwi dokei~.  
79 Aët. 2.3.2 DK 67A22: Leu/kippov de\ kai\ Dhmo/kritov kai\ 0Epi/kourov ou1t' e1myuxon 
ou1te pronoi/a| diakei~sqai [sc. to\n ko/smon], fu/sei de/ tini a0lo/gw| e0k tw~n a0to/mwn 
sunestw~ta.  
80 Theophrastus De sens. 58: peri\ de\ tou~ fronei~n e0pi\ tosou~ton ei1rhken o3ti gi/netai 
summe/trwv e0xou/shv th~v yuxh~v meta\ th\n ki/nhsin. Also found in situ in DK A135, G 
131. Translation adapted from Graham. I have opted to follow the codices rather than Diels 
or Schneider, who emend to kata\ th\n krh~sin and kata\ th\n kra~sin, respectively. While 
Theophrastus does go on to use kra~siv in his descriptions of Democritean theory of mind, 
I still think that the previous reading makes perfectly good sense and ought not to be 
emended. My reasons will be given below. 
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place which we Greeks now call air, [said] 'All things does Zeus ponder and all things does 
he know and give and take away and king is he of all things.'"81 Whatever the actual tone 
of these words, Democritus too thought that the air is filled with the soul or fire atoms and 
thus with principia mentis.82  These are the very atoms which, by means of respiration, 
sustain any mind.  Aside from this intimate application, such atoms would also, it seems, 
necessarily form occasional conglomerates according to the atomists' principle of the 
aggregation of like substances.83  It is therefore tempting to identify them as the source of 
the ei1dwla which Cicero describes as imagines divinitate praeditas, i.e. as a sort of 
transient, sublunary predecessors of Epicurus' intermundial gods.84  Yet our understanding 
of these ei1dwla is complicated by the fact that Democritus seems to use the term both for 
the off-flowing atomic films by means of which all things are perceived, and for certain 
objects more persistent and extraordinary, even displaying powers of communication and 
intentionality, and therefore more akin to the quasi-demonic ei1dwla or "phantoms" of 
Homer.  However, by reference to the latter, a number of scholars have dismissed the 
possibility of the term ei1dwlon being used in both applications, in favor of an 
interpretation which would have them only be the effluences from all bodies.  Homer's 
ei1dwla, they note, are in two instances described as temporary creations, bearing a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 DK B30: tw~n logi/wn a0nqrw/pwn o0li/goi a0natei/nantev ta\v xei~rav e0ntau~qa, o4n 
nu~n h0e/ra kale/omen oi99 3Ellhnev: pa/nta, ei]pan, Zeu\v muqe/etai kai\ pa/nq' ou[tov oi]de 
kai\ didoi~ kai\ a0fare/etai kai\ basileu\v ou[tov tw~n pa/ntwn. Translation adapted from 
Guthrie (1965) 479. For discussion of the fragment, see ibid. I will have more to say on 
this fragment below, when I come to a fuller discussion of Democritus and allegoresis. 
82 De Respir. 471b30-472a18; DK A106, G 114.  
83 cf., e.g., DK A128, G 124; DK A165, G 86; DK A99a, G 87; DK B164, G61. cf. Guthrie 
(1965) 409f.  
84 DK A78, G 188 – where they fill the air; DK B166, G 187 – Sextus Adv. Math. 9.19 – 
where they are beneficial or harmful and communicate to men; see also DK A77, G 186 – 
Plutarch Quaest. conviv. 734f-735b (discussed at greater length below) – where they are 
emitted from all bodies. 
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resemblance to someone still alive but otherwise having no meaningful connection to them 
– and these alone, they claim, must provide the relevant conceptual background of the 
Democritean ei1dwla.85  But we would do well to keep in mind the other application of the 
term for the persistent spirits in Hades, one of which – that of Teiresias – still enjoys his 
mind (no/ov).86 
 The concept of the ei1dwlon as endowed with an independent existence finds an 
extension in another instance of the term which has been neglected in Democritean studies, 
a fragment from a dirge of Pindar's:  
o0lbi/a| d' a3pantev ai1sa| lusi/ponon teleta\n  
kai\ sw~ma me\n pa/ntwn e3petai qana/tw| perisqenei~ 
zwo\n d' e1ti lei/petai ai0w~nov ei1dwlon: to\ ga/r e0sti mo/non 
e0k qew~n: eu3dei de\ prasso/ntwn mele/wn, a0ta\r eu9do/ntessin e0n polloi~v 
o0nei/roiv  
dei//knusi terpnw~n e0fe/rpoisan xalepw~n te kri/sin. 
In happy fate all die a death 
That frees from care,  
And yet there still will linger behind 
A living image of life, 
For this alone has come from the gods. 
It sleeps while the members are active; 
But to those who sleep themselves 
It reveals in myriad visions 
The fateful approach 
Of adversities or delights. 87 
 
Without exploring the possible connections – already famously suggested by Aristotle and 
Thrasylus – between Democritean and Pythagorean doctrines (Orphic parallels of which 
are likely in evidence here),88 I will only highlight the interaction of the independently 
existing ei1dwlon with the dreamer to whom it reveals the "oncoming issue of delights and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Apollo and Aeneas (Il. 5.450); Athena and Penelope (Od. 4.796).  
86 On the ei1dwla in Hades: Il. 23.72; Od. 11.476, 24.14.  
87 ff. 114, 115 Bowra; 131a, b Snell/Maehler. I follow Bremmer (1983) 7, in printing them 
together, and print his augmented text of the translation given by Jaeger (1947) 75.  
88 De anim. 404 a17ff; DL IX.38. 
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hardships," as it is further evidence of a well established conception extending well beyond 
that of the temporary creation of mere images. 
 Of the atomic ei1dwla, according to Sextus and others, Democritus also thought 
that they "indicate beforehand future events to human beings."89 While the force of this 
phrase may be mitigated by reference to the ei1dwla produced by all bodies, and the 
"foretelling" thereby reduced to a revelation of the motions and intentions of other and 
sometimes distant bodies, and therefore some thoroughly un-deified forecasting of future 
events,90 it is again tempting, I think, to take this as a stronger claim about at least some 
ei1dwla as rather apotheosized beings capable of contemplating and communicating 
profound thought and foresight.   
 On this hypothesis, if Sextus is not merely denigrating Democritus as a 
superstitious old coot in saying that he eu1xeto eu0lo/gxwn tuxei~n ei0dw/lwn, and if it is 
right in the first place to attribute to Democritus a belief in these "daimonic" figures, then 
we can make easy sense of his praying to them, and not merely "hoping" or "desiring" as 
others have suggested. The easy sense arises from the necessary possibility of a human 
being's communicating his thoughts by the same mechanism, willy-nilly, to the more 
"divine".  The unique form eu0lo/gxwn, an adjective found only in the repeated paraphrases 
of this description of Democritus, and therefore a likely and characteristic coinage, also 
carries with it a mite of support for this argument, adhering from the common use of the 
cognate verb, lagxa/nw, for the action of tutelary deities.91  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 DK B166, G 187: proshmai/nein te ta\ me/llonta toi~v a0nqrw/poiv.  
90 cf. DK A67, G 186 – Plutarch Quaest. conviv. 734f-735b. 
91 LSJ s.v. The uncompounded verb is used (in participial form) in DK B21, our fragment 
on Homer. Besides the passage from Sextus, eu0lo/gxov only appears in Eusebius 
Praeparatio evangelica 5.17.4.4, Plutarch's life of Aemilius Paullus 1.4.2, and De defectu 
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 Perhaps some of the ei1dwla as mere effluences were assumed to accumulate more 
soul atoms and thus to become the large and persistent ei1dwla which Sextus describes. 
Yet his persistent references to gods, his conception of ei1dwla, and the profound 
significance of their activities for the lives of human beings, suggests some connection 
between the two. And whatever this connection may have been, it is an inescapable 
assumption that the divine was that which possessed soul of some remarkable degree of 
activity. Most important for this essay is the fact that this divine activity, while influential 
and prone to fluctuation, is never conceived as divine possession of human beings. The 
influence is rather one of an exchange of atomic films, a communication of thought and 
minimal matter.  
 Now, since the only difference between a human being and such a divinity qua 
minds, lies in the limits of the human body as a vessel of soul atoms, the looseness of 
Democritus' usage of qei~ov, like the loose sense of superhuman divinity which Cicero 
derided, is entirely apprehensible when we come to his remarks on Homer, poets, and 
mind, tout court. 
 Further considerations of the embodied soul are necessary before we explore the 
psychology of the poet. Again, soul or mind is a sort of fire or heat. The latter, 
Theophrastus tells us in his generous discussion of the Democritean theory of sensation, is 
increased, curiously, by the creation of empty spaces.  In the body, he recounts, heat is said 
to be increased e.g. by "the sharp-(or hot-)tasting" (to\n o0cu/n), which causes the 
contraction of things within our bodies and thus the widening of interstices.92 One might be 
inclined to assume that this is because the soul or fire atoms can then enter from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
oraculorum 419a8,  
92 De sens. 65, DK XX, G131. 
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atmosphere or whatever surrounding spaces.  But that simple picture is complicated by 
another passage from Theophrastus, where he relates that Democritus explained the shape 
of a flame by reference to the gradual cooling of the outer edges, which results in a 
proportional condensation toward its upper tip.93 The increase in heat, then, is the result of 
the widening itself, so that we may assume that while some grouping of those atoms is 
necessary for the phenomena to occur at all, those same phenomena are more pronounced 
when there is some empty space between the constituent atoms (but, we must assume, 
within certain bounds).  
 The applicability of the last suggestion to the functions of those atoms as mind 
atoms is suggested by a passage from Plutarch, which reports that ei1dwla which bear the 
impressions both of the shape of the body and of the state of its soul are transmitted more 
reliably in smooth, unhindering air.94 One might reasonably wonder, then, if this would 
transfer over to the increased reliability of all perception within an embodied soul marked 
by the same properties.  Although this leaves unanswered the damning question of how a 
mind so constituted could be coordinated despite its spatial extension, the basic idea would 
support a straightforward and naïve account of the more perceptive mind as one 
characterized by many soul atoms with much space maintained between them.  
 To add to this, the crudeness and naïveté of most early accounts of mind 
encourages me to draw a parallel from Seneca's Quaestiones naturales on the topic of 
wind, concerning which "Democritus, it seems, offered an extremely simple explanation 
based directly on the restless dance of the atoms:"95 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 De ign. 52, DK A73, G60. 
94 Quastione convivales 734f735b, DK A77, G 186. 
95 Guthrie (1965) 425. 
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Democritus ait: cum in angusto inani multa sint corpuscula quae ille atomos vocat, sequi 
ventum. at contra quietum et placidum aeris statum esse, cum in multo inani pauca sint 
corpuscula. nam quemadmodum in foro aut vico, quamdiu paucitas est, sine tumultu ambulatur, 
ubi turba in angustum concurrit, aliorum in alios incidentium rixa fit: sic in hoc quo circumdati 
sumus spatio, cum exiguum locum multa corpora impleverint, necesse est alia aliis incidant et 
impellant ac repellantur implicenturque et comprimantur, ex quibus nascitur ventus, cum illa 
quae colluctubantur, incubuere et diu fluctuata ac dubia inclinavere se. at ubi in magna laxitate 
corpora pauca versantur, nec arietare possunt nec impelli.96  
 
According to Democritus, when many particles, which he calls atoms, are confined in a narrow 
void space, a wind arises. And by contrast the air is calm and peaceful when few particles are 
found in a large void. For just as in the marketplace or a plaza, as long as there are only a few 
people, they circulate freely, but when a crowd enters a confined space, a commotion results as 
they jostle each other; so in this space in which we are surrounded, when many bodies fill a 
small space, they are bound to run into each other, to push and bounce off, become entangled 
and be squeezed together, from which arises wind, when the bodies which have struggled, stood 
still, and moved back and forth for a long time with uncertain direction begin to move in 
concert. But when a few bodies move about in a great open space, they are not able either to 
ram each other or to be pushed around.  
 
The parallel cannot be unwarranted, given the relationship of soul and breath and air which 
we have seen, and it immediately suggests a plausibly simple picture of the calm of the 
soul: just as the motes may flit in the rays of light falling into our rooms when the air is 
still nonetheless, so the ever-moving and embodied soul atoms might maintain their 
activity while in sum comprising the calmest of souls. For my part, it is an apt and 
charming illustration of the subjective experience of even the most self-aware moments of 
mental calm.  
 This picture also recalls the line from Theophrastus quoted above in the discussion 
of divinity: "Concerning thinking he has said this much: it occurs when the soul is in a 
balanced state amid the movement."97 To justify now the return to the codd. in reading 
meta\ th\n ki/nhsin ("amid the movement") rather than kata\ th\n kra~sin ("according to the 
mixture"), one need only point to the incessant movement of soul atoms, and the picture 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Quaest. nat. 5.2, DK A93a, G 80. Trans. Graham.  
97 Theophrastus De sens. 58: peri\ de\ tou~ fronei~n e0pi\ tosou~ton ei1rhken o3ti gi/netai 
summe/trwv e0xou/shv th~v yuxh~v meta\ th\n ki/nhsin. Also found in situ in DK A135, G 
131. Translation adapted from Graham.  
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which has been developed here of the soul atoms balanced in their spacing, a spacing 
which is again definitive of the spectrum of phenomena toward the middle of which lies 
the full range of conscious experience. 
 The preceding considerations may reinforce and in turn be reinforced by one 
interpretation of a much-debated Democritean line well worth contemplating now: 
"Among souls, the ones being moved out of great intervals are neither stable nor happy."98 
I contend that the souls in question here are being moved, not "through" as many have read 
it, but "out of the great intervals," as James Warren has suggested,99 i.e. out of a condition 
marked by the larger interstices that establish superior perceptual and mental capacities. 
Warren's arguments are aimed solely at assessing a view of Democritean eu0qumi/a as a 
particular arrangement or harmony of soul atoms, and his conclusions are presented with 
great reservations. His principal problem is why, on any theory of the soul as harmony, the 
intervals should be large. Yet in addition to the foregoing suggestions as to the 
preferability of large intervals, another cogent piece of evidence can be added which at 
least validates Warren's construal of the Greek. The phrase e0k mega/lwn diasthma/twn, 
the focal point of the debate over this fragment, has a parallel in an Aristotelian passage 
which could hardly be more helpful: "Nor is the lung able again compressing itself from a 
wide interval (e0k pollou~ diasth/matov) to squeeze out the breath by force."100 The 
contraction of the lungs e0k pollou~ diasth/matov, which is most naturally read as "from a 
wide interval", is sufficiently analagous to the soul-compression just described, so that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 DK B191, G 211: ai9 d' e0k mega/lwn diasthma/twn kinou/menai tw~n yuxe/wn ou1te 
eu0staqe/ev ei0si\n ou1te eu1qumoi. 
99 Warren (2002) 44ff. 
100 De audibilibus 800a36-b1. ou0de\ [o9 pneu/mwn du/natai] pa/lin e0k pollou~ diasth/matov 
suna/gwn e9auto\n e0kqli/bein bi/a| to\ pneu~ma. Not cited by Warren. Hett in the Loeb 
translates, "after a great expansion".  
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Aristotelian passage is again excellent evidence for Warren's interpretation.  Otherwise, 
too, the idea seems undeniably Democritean.  In other fragments he proclaims that the lack 
of measure in life is accompanied by the constant alternation between states of desire and 
fleeting moments of gratification, the pleasure of which is diminished as a result of the 
frequency – that is to say, the physical intervals between which the soul moves, in its 
passage from states of pleasure, desire, etc., are shortened, and proportionally with the 
shrinking periods of time.101 The life of moderation, consequently, is the life of a slower 
rhythm and of greater experiences of pleasure.102 Lastly, whereas the pleasures of the body 
fill and moisten and produce those frequent changes which prevent any sustained measure 
in the soul, the pleasures of the mind sustain the soul's heat, and thus the desirably large 
intervals which constitute the optimal harmony of the soul.103  
 With this simple conjunction of Democritus' ethics and physics, one is also led to 
assume the identity of this state with that of the philosopher-sage. After all, eu0qumi/a, if not 
restricted to those of ample endowment and learning, must at the very least be fully 
consistent with the philosopher's ideal; if we can judge from his own life, it was definitely 
not one of empty-mindedness. This should leave no doubt, then, as to the possible relation 
of such good cheer to the most fruitful intellection: the very state of the soul which 
establishes eu0qumi/a must also render it more penetrating in its judgment, and more 
susceptible to all perceptions.  
 Yet, should doubts remain, Plutarch comes to our aid by having recorded a rather 
Pythagorean explanation of Socrates' daimo/nion, his "customary divine sign", which we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 DK B235, G280. 
102 DK B211, G286; DK B232, G 293. 
103 DK B146, G 285.  
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may tentatively connect, in its barest details, to Democritus and his ei1dwla; as Jackson 
Hershbell has remarked, Plutarch himself reveals a tendency to equate Democritus' 
ei1dwla with the dai/monev of his own world-view.104 We thus find a very illuminating 
connection between Democritus and Socrates, through these lingering philosophical 
opinions on revelation.  According to the explanation offered by Plutarch's character 
Simmias, air imprints of the "lo/goi of dai/monev, passing through all things, echo only in 
those who possess untroubled character and a calm soul."105 Plutarch continues with a 
remark which hints at a connection between Democritean eu0qumi/a and the theory of 
increased perception of ei1dwla in dreams: 
oi9 de\ polloi\ katadarqou~sin oi1ontai to daimo/nion a0nqrw/poiv e0piqeia/zein, ei0 d' 
e0grhgoro/tav kai\ kaqestw~tav e0n tw|~ fronei~n o9moi/wv kinei~, qaumasto\n h9gou~ntai kai\ 
a1piston: w3sper a2n ei1 tiv oi1oito to\n mousiko\n a0neime/nh| th|~ lu/ra| xrw/menon, o3tan susth|~ 
toi~v to/noiv h2 kaqarmosqh|~, mh\ a3ptesqai mhde\ xrh~sqai. to\ ga\r ai1tion ou0 sunorw~si, th\n 
e0n au0toi~v a0narmosti/an kai\ taraxh/n…106  
 
Most people however believe that it is only in sleep that the 'daimonic' power inspires humans. 
That it should move them in the same way when awake and of sound mind they find surprising 
and incredible. But that is like thinking that a musician uses his lyre only when it is unstrung, 
and does not touch or use it when it has been adjusted and tuned. They do not see that the cause 
is the tunelessness and confusion within themselves. 
 
The disharmony and tumult here contrasted with the calm of the virtuous soul are 
enticingly reminiscent of the slow, extended rhythm and wide intervals of Democritean 
eu0qumi/a.  Another inviting comparison comes from the concept of a communication 
which, far from being incompatible with reason and self-control, is in fact only perceptible 
for human beings who possess them. This passage alone would be suggestive enough, but 
for the lack of any straightforward physical details which could link these descriptions with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Hershbell (1982) 104. 
105 De gen. Soc. 589D: oi9 tw~n daimo/nwn lo/goi dia\ pa/ntwn fero/menoi mo/noiv 
e0nhxou~si toi~v a0qo/rubon h]qov kai\ nh/nemon e1xousi th\n yuxh/n, ou4v dh\ kai\ i9erou\v kai\ 
daimoni/ouv a0nqrw/pouv kalou~men. I print the text of Nesselrath.  
106 ibid. 588F. Text and translation are those of Nesselrath. 
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the wide intervals of Democritus. But one does not have to look far to find the missing 
link: in one of his charming Quaestiones convivales, entitled "Why truffles are thought to 
be produced by thunder, and why people believe that sleepers are never struck by 
thunder",107 Plutarch provides a quotation from Democritus before proceeding to an 
explanation of the second problem. The solution which follows is not ascribed to 
Democritus, but some association is unmistakable:  
ma~llon ga\r e1rrwtai kai\ sune/sthken kai\ a0nterei/dei ta\ sw/mata tw~n e0grhgoro/twn, a3te 
dh\ pa~si toi~v me/resi peplhrwme/na pneu/matov: u9f' ou[ kai\ ta\v ai0sqh/seiv e0pistre/fontov 
w3sper e0n o0rga/nw| kai\ sfi/ggontov eu1tonon ge/gone kai\ sunexe\v au9tw|~ ikai\ pukno\n to\ 
zw|~on. e0n de\ u3pnoiv e0canei~tai kai\ mano\n kai\ a0nw/malon kai\ a1tonon kai\ diakexume/non, kai\ 
po/rouv e1sxhke pollou/v, tou~ pneu/matov e0ndido/ntov kai\ a0polei/pontov…108 
 
The body of those awake is firmer, compacter, and more resistant, because it is filled in all its 
parts with vital spirit. This vital spirit tightens up and attunes the organs of sense like strings in 
a musical instrument, and gives the whole animal its proper tension, solidity, and compactness. 
In sleep, on the other hand, the body relaxes, becomes loose-textured and uneven in its 
consistency, and is left untensed and diffuse. The result is that many passages are opened as the 
vital spirit weakens and is lost.  
 
For Democritus, likewise, sleep occurs when the exhalation and other release of soul atoms 
comes to outweigh the balancing effects of inhalation, and the obvious inference is that the 
intervals of soul atoms become necessarily wider in all beings, thus accounting for the 
greater prevalence of dream divination over waking sharp-wits.  
 Although these passages also recall certain Platonic descriptions of dreaming which 
in their rather Pythagorean and Empedoclean bent point the way toward a fundamental 
affiliation between Democritus and Plutarch's accounts of dreams and divine 
communication,109 I would prefer to pass over them in favor of certain discussions from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Quaest. conviv. IV.2, 664Bf. The translation of the title is from the Loeb, and the Greek 
is Dia\ ti/ ta\ u3dna dokei~ th|~ bronth|~ gi/nesqai, kai\ dia\ ti/ tou\v kaqeu/dontav oi1ontai 
mh\ keraunou~sqai.  108	  ibid.	  666Af.	  
109 Especially interesting are the descriptions at Rep. 571dff. and Tim. 71dff.  
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Aristotle which bear a more striking resemblance.  
 In De divinatione per somnum, Aristotle refers to Democritus, the ei1dwla, the 
calmer air which permits a more accurate transmission of impulses, and the increased 
receptivity of the mind owing to its relaxation.110 His lack of concern in that work for the 
relationship between such openness and the waking forms of intelligence leaves the 
account lacking for our purposes, but through his mention of the melancholic as also 
demonstrating vivid and prophetic dreams we find our connecting thread. The melancholic 
feature widely in the corpus Aristotelicum, and although the most thorough discussion of 
them occurs in the pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata, Philip van der Eijk has recently 
revealed the underlying consistency which unites the diverse statements in the genuine and 
the spurious work.111 The crucial characteristic for a comparison with Democritus is, of 
course, the predominance of air. In the black bile, it is said, there is much air, just as there 
is in wine, which reveals this in its frothiness—especially when boiled.112 In the relevant 
chapter of the Problemata, the principle thesis is that most men of genius are melancholic, 
and van der Eijk has proven that even within the genuine works, there is a very close 
association of the melancholic with the man of genius (eu0fuh/v). That the physiological 
causes to which Aristotle would attribute these dispositions are not far from those in the 
Problemata is suggested well enough by the familiar vocabulary of impetuosity and flights 
of fancy, but also more concretely in the De anima, where Aristotle says that those with 
soft flesh (malako/sarkoi) are very intelligent (eu0fuei/v).113  Without allowing this to take 
us any farther afield, I would like to dwell for a moment on Aristotle's orientation toward 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 De div. per somn. 464a.  
111 van der Eijk (2005) ch. 5.  
112 Pr. 953b 
113 De an. 421a23ff. 
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the peculiarity which unites these types.  I must refer again to van der Eijk's expert 
analysis, in which he identifies the unifying capacity as an "intuition" (eu0stoxi/a) arising 
from a "special predisposition" (eu0fui/a), and notes that "the peritton ["extraordinariness"] 
of melancholics in the areas mentioned [sc. poetry and philosophy] should be sought in a 
certain intuition and creativity which does not impede reason, but rather enhances it, with 
phantasia playing an important mediatory role."114 Aristotle's eu0stoxi/a, being an ability to 
see similarities (to\ o3moion qewrei~n), may be compared with Democritus' gnw/mh gnhsi/h, 
the "legitimate judgment", which penetrates beyond the testimony of the senses to grasp 
the finer truth in the hidden connections between phenomena which remain divided at the 
level of no/mov. In the juxtaposition of the two, (if my interpretation is correct) Democritus' 
gnwmh/ stands for a bundle of intellectual processes, and thus one senses that for 
Democritus there was no clear distinction between such functions of the soul as reason, 
imagination, and insight. With Aristotle, we have come to a vastly more sophisticated 
philosophy of mind, and also much clearer prejudices concerning rationality. Such 
prejudices, and the attendant sense of a real antinomy between reason and intuition, can 
only derive from the precise delineations undertaken by Plato, Aristotle, and their 
successors. But it is very telling that even for Aristotle the natural disposition necessary for 
the production of good poetry is the very same as that for philosophy.  So to assume that 
Democritus felt even less of a push to distinguish the two activities is wholly reasonable.  
While he dwelt upon the passivity of all sensation and on the ineluctable fact of one's 
nature, he yet felt no incompatibility between this and the magnificence of individual 
minds. 
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 With that we come back to a picture rather reminiscent of that implied by the 
undifferentiated authority of the poet and sage, and articulated in the conventional 
invocations in Homer, Hesiod, Pindar and the rest, and. The majority opinion on these, 
represented by the quote from Murray above, must be close enough to the truth: surely 
e0nqousiasmo/v, as most Greeks would have conceived it, had no place in early Greek 
poetics. From what we have seen, it had no place in Democritus' philosophy, either. 
 But we have seen a willingness in him to acknowledge the material fluctuations of 
one's mental capacity and their dependence upon environmental influences, and to 
conceive of the maximal cognitive states as divine. A simple and compelling description of 
this dynamic is found in Guthrie's approving translation of Zeller: "He can quite well have 
supposed that certain more favourably constituted souls [one thinks of the fu/siv 
qea/zousa of Homer] absorb a greater wealth of 'images' and are by them aroused to a 
more lively motion than others, and this is the basis of the poetic gift and temperament."115  
But this is precisely the state desired by Democritus the philosopher as well – and thus the 
boundary drawn between poet and philosopher has disappeared. One might even wonder if 
the poihth/v of f. 18 is not in the least intended to mark out the poet alone, but plays 
instead on the looseness of the term just as much as Plato sometimes did. 
 One might object that a blatant distinction is indicated by the works grouped under 
the heading Mousika\ de\ ta/de, especially in their concern for such purely aesthetic issues 
as rhythm and harmony (Peri\ r9uqmw~n kai\ a9rmoni/hv), the beauty of words (Peri\ 
kallosu/nhv e0pe/wn), the euphony and cacophony of letters (Peri\ eu0fw/nwn kai\ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Guthrie (1965) 477-8, translating and citing Zeller-Nestle (1920) 1164.  
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dusfw\nwn gramma/twn).116  This line of thought was taken up recently by Brancacci, 
who, combatting all "irrationalist exegesis" of Democritean poetics, took one crucial step 
in line with mine when he insisted that e0nqousiasmo/v in Democritus indicates an 
"intensification of the poet's ability, and not a kind of possession or mystic rapture."117 Yet 
after such a promising beginning he goes on to write, "For Democritus, however, divine 
inspiration no longer assured, as with the poets Homer and Hesiod, the truth of the poetic 
work, but its beauty: beautiful—not true—are all the things that the poet may write, driven 
by enthusiasm and divine breath."118 True, Democritus says only that inspired writings are 
kala/.  But in the same vein as that fragment,119 we read that "It is of a divine mind always 
to think something kalo/n."120 The same label of 'divine' makes this sentence considerably 
less amenable to the restriction "beautiful—not true." Here, "divine" is applied not simply 
to the poet who writes pretty verses, but to the mind—any mind—which is ever 
considering something kalo/n.121 The idea becomes even more problematic for Brancacci's 
reading of the first fragment, when one notes the very rational connotations of the verb 
translated "to consider," dialogi/zesqai, some of the primary senses of which are "to 
balance accounts," "to calculate exactly," "to consider fully," "to distinguish".122  A similar 
and revealing claim is made in another fragment: "The greatest pleasures come from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 DL IX.48.  
117 Brancacci (2007) 202.  
118 Brancacci (2007) 204; emphasis in the original. 
119 DK B18, G 160. 
120 DK B122, G 393: qei/ou nou~ to\ a0ei/ ti dialogi/zesqai kalo/n. 
121 An excellent comparandum from Aristotle, Met. 1074b23ff.: po/teron ou]n diafe/rei ti 
h2 ou0de\n to\ noei~n to\ kalo\n h2 to\ tuxo/n; h2 kai\ a1topon to\ dianoei~sqai peri\ e0ni/wn; 
dh~lon toi/nun o3ti to\ qeio/taton kai\ timiw/taton noei~, kai\ ou0 metaba/llei.  
122 LSJ s.v. But cf. Taylor (2008) 3.  
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contemplation of the kala/ among deeds."123  It would be very odd to read these words as 
recommending a life of unmitigated fantasizing about beautiful things with no 
consideration of their truth. We may get something more down to earth out of this 
fragment if we note again the moral weight obvious here and in many other Democritean 
fragments,124 and combine that weight with the striking dictum, "For all men the same 
thing is good and true: but for each another thing is pleasant."125 This succinct statement of 
(what I take to be) his moral and theoretical realism militates strongly against Brancacci's 
interpretation, which would compel us to see Democritus and his favorite poet as a pair of 
starry-eyed woolgatherers. 
 To return to something more pertinent to Homer and the other poets, let us 
juxtapose with Brancacci's description Democritus' attested commitment to an allegorical 
reading of Homer. In his commentary on the Odyssey, Eustathius writes, "Some think that 
the sun is Zeus, others, with Democritus, that the vapour on which the sun feeds is 
ambrosia," and he also notes that Democritus suggested Peni/a "Poverty" as the mother of 
the loyal Eumaeus.126  Now, any allegorical reading, needless to say, cannot get off the 
ground without the assumption of underlying and interesting truths, and the truths which 
Democritus apparently found in Homer range, as we see here, from rather homely moral 
psychology to surprisingly sophisticated physical theory. Further, it is hard to imagine 
these two examples as illustrating anything but the generous assumption of most 
allegorical exegesis, that the original author was aware of the higher meaning hidden in his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 DK B194, G 283: ai9 mega/lai te/ryeiv a0po\ tou~ qea~sqai ta\ kala\ tw~n e1rgwn 
gi/nontai. 
124 cf., e.g., DK B63, G 351; DK B102, G 363; DK B207, G284 – which is especially 
noteworthy: h9donh\n ou0 pa~san, a0lla\ th\n e0pi\ tw|~ kalw|~ ai9rei~sqai xrew/n. 
125 DK B68, G 268: a0nqrw/poiv pa~si tou0to\n a0gaqo\n kai\ a0lhqe/v: h9du\ de\ a1llwi a1llo. 
126 DK 68B24, 25. 
	  	   38	  
text.  
 Lest we should stop there in our analysis, we are urged on by Aristotle, who 
recorded Democritus' eager approval of Homer's use of the word a0llofronei~n: the word, 
to his mind, grasped the very truth of the corporeality of the mind and of consciousness as 
an alterable state, not a simple integer which came and went with bouts of madness or 
stupor.127  Secondly, the much-debated fragment concerning the lo/gioi and Zeus finds a 
new place now as a piece of allegoresis; as was noted above, the attribution of omniscience 
and omnipotence to the continuous source of all soul atoms finds some basis in 
Democritus' theory, albeit one which apparently did not allow the actual consciousness of 
the atmosphere in toto. And finally, to end on a note of playful conjecture, since our only 
sources which link the theory of ei1dwla to Leucippus attribute it at once to Leucippus and 
Democritus, and are moreover quite late,128 I am willing to speculate that the theory found 
its origin not in the founder of atomism, but in his pupil the allegorist.  And even if 
Leucippus did establish a precedent, all of our evidence points to Democritus expanding 
upon it in an imaginative way which gave material reality to the Homeric ei1dwla.  
Homer's pessimism about human knowledge and his recognition of the fortuitous passivity 
of most perception find new words in Democritus' mouth. An admiring allegorist, 
Democritus drew upon Homer's captivating descriptions of the poet's fully mindful 
inspiration and anyone's memorable dreams, creating from them a theory of knowledge, 
perception, precognition which substantiated the perspicuity of the poet almost as well as 
that of his interpreter. The value which Democritus placed on Homer's wisdom can only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Il. 23.698; De an. 404a29; cf. Met. 1009b28. See also Guthrie (1965) 452 n. 1. 
128 Aët. IV.9.6, DK 68 A119, 126; IV.13.1, DK 67 A29, and Alexander In Arist. De sensu 
24.14-22, 56.12-15. 
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indicate that the poet, too, was one of the divinely wise and calm.  
 That said, these considerations alone cannot afford any definite conclusions about 
his further theoretical commitments, as to whether the poet himself must always be 
considered conscious of all of the truths which he utters while so dressing them up. But it 
is unlikely that he was totally charitable, given Democritus' commitment to a theory of 
fairly recent cultural progress and invention, combined with the impression one gets of the 
imperfect allegoresis of the opinion of the lo/gioi. Yet the pivotal fact remains that the 
poet is in fact uttering truths that Democritus thinks worthy of study. Thus the kosmos 
which the poet constructs is one of beauty and, on some fundamental level at least, one of 
truth. 
 In light of these conclusions, consider the following well-known passage: 
1Espete nu~n moi, Mou~sai  0Olu/mpia dw/mat' e1xousai- 
u9mei~v ga\r qeai/ e0ste, pa/reste/ te, i1ste/ te pa/nta, 
h9mei~v de\ kle/ov oi]on a0kou/omen ou0de/ ti i1dmen-  
oi3 tinev h9gemo/nes Danaw~n kai\ koi/ranoi h]san:  
plhtu\n d' ou0k a2n e0gw\ muqh/somai ou0d' o0nomh/nw,  
ou0d' ei1 moi de/ka me\n glw~ssai, de/ka de\ sto/mat' ei]en, 
fwnh\ d' a1rrhktov, xa/lkeon de/ moi h]tor e0nei/h,  
ei0 mh\ 0Olumpia/dev Mou~sai, Dio\v ai0gio/xoio  
qugate/rev, mnhsai/aq' o3soi u9po\ 1Ilion h]lqon:129 
 
Tell me now, you Muses who have your homes on Olympos.  
For you, who are goddesses, are there, and you know all things,  
and we have heard only the rumour of it and know nothing.  
Who then of those were the chief men and lords of the Danaans?  
I could not tell over the multitude of them nor name them, 
not if I had ten tongues and ten mouths, not if I had 
a voice never to be broken and a heart of bronze within me, 
not unless the Muses of Olympia, daughters 
of Zeus of the aegis, remembered all those who came beneath Ilion.  
 
"A voice never to be broken" and "a heart of bronze" – on reflection, are the words 
e0nqousiasmo/v and  i9ero\n pneu~ma not stunningly sensible now, as a very poetical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Il. 2.484-92.  Trans. Lattimore.  
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expression of high esteem for the poet, in words more traditionally forceful yet thoroughly 
reappropriated by the allegorist cum philosopher?130 When we turn elsewhere in 
Democritus and read about the umbilical cord "as an anchorage against waves and 
slippage, a cable and vine for the begotten and ripening fruit", the poetical verbosity seems 
entirely at home. One may add the indirect but weighty precedent for i9ero\n pneu~ma in 
such words as e0ne/pneusan de/ moi au0dh\n | qe/spin,131 and of i9ero/n in such expressions as 
"the august might of Alcinous" (i9ero\n me/nov 0Alkino/oio).132  And the vexing 
e0nqousiasmo/v may refer, finally, to the god within him that is his natural self, just as 
eu0daimoni/a denotes the good state of the dai/mwn which is nothing other than the one's 
yuxh/.133 It follows that e0nqousiasmo/v for Democritus may have two features, as a 
cognitive state marked simply by the periodically greater intake of soul atoms and thus the 
"divinizing of one's nature", and as the absorption of ei1dwla, which swell the soul with 
atoms bearing thoughts from the divine. Possession it most certainly is not – unless it be 
the possession of greater thoughts and powers by the human soul in question. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 cf. Kahn (1985) 14: "[Democritus] relies entirely on the shifting metaphors of quasi-
poetic speech."  
131 Th. 31-2. cf. Th. 97, Od. 1.371.  
132 Il. 8.419. 
133 DK B171. 
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